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International human rights NGOs and institutions have been at the
vanguard of multiple advocacy campaigns designed to galvanize global
support for human rights. The impact of these initiatives has been dra-
matic. States have adopted human rights conventions, ratiﬁed treaties,
supported new human rights committees and courts, and extended the
mandate of existing international and regional organizations to include
human rights. The sheer growth of human rightsNGOs and the increased
reference to human rights by states, international organizations, and
other actors shows that human rights are now a major focal point for
transnational mobilization. The global middle class, widely seen as
a mainstay of human rights observance, is projected to increase from
1.8 billion in 2012 to 3.2 billion by 2020.1
Human rights research has also found cause for optimism. Some scho-
lars argue we are living through a ‘justice cascade’ where transnational
movements for human rights allied to international law have made accel-
erating gains in the elimination of human rights violations such as
torture.2 Some have even claimed that cruelty and killing are in decline,
1 Homi Kharas and Geoffrey Gertz, “The New Global Middle Class: A Cross-Over from
West to East,” in Cheng Li (ed.), China’s Emerging Middle Class, Beyond Economic
Transformation (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). Although much of
the projected growth is expected to take place in China and India where human rights
advocates have so far struggled tomake headway, the emergence of a global middle class is
likely to narrow the material and cultural divides that slow the emergence of a global set of
values. The mass of global polling data collected in the World Values Survey (WVS)
provides empirical evidence of how economic development leads to value changes con-
ducive to democracy. European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), Global
Trends 2030 –Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World, European Union Institute
for Security Studies, 2012, p. 29: www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/espas-
report-global-trends-2030-citizens-in-an-interconnected-and-polycentric-world/.
2 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & co, 2011); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998); Beth A. Simmons,Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law
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due in no small part to the rights revolution.3 Others suggest that even in
a world where Western powers no longer dominate, international liberal
norms embedded in global institutions will endure.4 These advocacy and
scholarly claims all sustain a hopeful story in which the future for human
rights mobilization is a positive and enduring one.
But, as many of the chapters that follow will argue, this is not the only
possible future for human rights. Alternative accounts to the mobilization
narrative see a future that is muchmore one of ambivalence, ineffectiveness,
failure, and even irrelevance. We group these critiques under four headings:
scope conditions, backlash, localization, and utopias and endtimes.
Scope conditions for successful human rights activism include embed-
ding mobilization within a broader social movement for political change
that harnesses actors with varying motivations to the cause, an alliance
with power to realize human rights ends when persuasion is not enough,
and the material capacity of states to make real the legal commitments
they have made. These favorable conditions hold when countries are at
peace and when they already enjoy some institutional, economic, and
social facilitating conditions for democracy. But the countries where
rights abuses are worst are what we will call “hard cases,” which lack
these favorable conditions. Outside the scope conditions for the success
of conventional mainstream approaches to rights advocacy, pragmatic
innovations may be necessary.
Human rights mobilization not only fails because of its lack of ancho-
rage in social coalitions, its inadequate alliance with state power, or a lack
of state capacity, it also faces resistance. Backlash is driven by those
threatened by human rights and powerful enough to resist. They some-
times exploit the opportunity to reframe or even demonize global rights to
mobilize the many against the rights message, while at other times more
subtle methods of non-engagement and resistance are employed.
Backlash encompasses a wide variety of strategies, in other words, ranging
in Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Christopher J. Fariss,
“Respect for Human RightsHas Improved over Time:Modeling the Changing Standard of
Accountability,” American Political Science Review 108, no. 2 (2014): 297–318; Ann
Marie Clark and Kathryn Sikkink, “Information Effects and Human Rights Data: Is the
Good News about Increased Human Rights Information Bad News for Human Rights
Measures?” Human Rights Quarterly 35, no. 3 (August 2013): 539–68; Jo Becker,
Campaigning for Justice: Human Rights Advocacy in Practice (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2012); Alison Brysk, Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
3 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity
(London: Penguin, 2012); Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of
Armed Conﬂict Worldwide (New York: Plume Books, 2012).
4 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of American
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
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from confrontation (openly resisting the obligations rights impose), to
evasion (ignoring rights demands) or instrumentalization (e.g., using
rights language to justify repressing individual speech or due process to
protect the “rights of the community”). Democracies as well as autocra-
cies can engage in behavior along this spectrum.
In an era that is marked by increasing political upheaval not only in
many parts of theGlobal South, but also in theUnited States and Europe,
we ask the question of whether backlash is increasing and what this means
for human rights going forward. The recent assault on human rights in the
United States provides a laboratory for evaluating the role of domestic
institutions, civil society, and norms in securing human rights. Protests in
support of rights in the weeks following the election of Donald Trump
also remind us that backlash can be deployed in favor of, and not only
against, human rights. Like previous critiques, backlash theorists under-
score the need to trim unbending principles in the face of political reality.
Pursuing some rights, such as religious freedom,may at times be counter-
productive. Similarly, backlash in support of rights faces the challenge of
tailoring principle to politics.
Human rights as they are understood in Western capitals have often
been poorly integrated in struggles for freedom and equality in the South.
To be effective, a greater awareness of local needs, actors, and strategies –
manifest in different forms of advocacy, and in alternative campaign
priorities – may be essential to achieve positive results. We label this
localization. The most inﬂuential account of this process, where global
principles are translated into local struggles, has been termed ‘vernacu-
larization’ and we examine it in depth. We also acknowledge the agency
that local human rights actors often display by examining how they use
human rights in their own customized ways to achieve their priorities.
This is all ‘human rights activism,’ but it may not look much like the
human rights with which we are familiar.
Finally, in utopias and endtimes, some scholars ask whether there is really
any future at all for human rights. They suggest that human rights may
represent a mistaken path taken on the road to delivering more genuine
freedom and equality, an illusion of a post-ideological world of liberal
freedoms that actually serves to deﬂect us from real progress toward social
and economic justice. Others claim that human rights may be an artifact
of a postcolonial world dominated by Western states that are declining in
the face of newly emerging non-liberal global powers, revitalized nation-
alism, resurgent religion, and the refusal of the middle classes to part with
any of their privilege.
Although normative discussions are in evidence throughout the
volume, we do not deal explicitly with the moral and philosophical basis
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of human rights. Questions about the foundations and justiﬁcation of
rights, about what a right is, what kinds of rights there are, about uni-
versality, about the conception of the person underlying rights, whether
that person must necessarily be conceived in ‘liberal’ terms, the justiﬁa-
bility of natural rights claims, whether political rights have priority, deon-
tology vs. utilitarianism, and the role of dignity as a moral foundation for
rights are not explicitly addressed for three reasons.
First, other recent works have considered these normative issues in
forensic detail.5 Second, normative arguments can be made for or
against both human rights as such, and against certain rights in parti-
cular. Such moral claims as these admit of no empirical resolution.
However, for some participants in these normative debates, it makes
a difference whether and how rights can be instantiated in speciﬁc real
world conditions: ought implies can. In this spirit, we focus on what
makes the difference in everyday success for human rights – the align-
ment of social and political forces, globally, nationally, and locally, and
the interests they pursue, including but not limited to those in greater
equality or freedom.
Third, following on from this, we see many of the sharpest debates
about human rights at the present juncture as about the feasibility of
making rights a reality and what tactics to use in pursuing that goal. So,
while we do have chapters that stake out opposing normative positions
in the debate, and while almost all the chapters discuss norms and
normative beliefs as empirical facts, we focus in the main on the politics
of making rights real rather than the strength of the moral argument
behind them.
In Section 1, we give due attention to what are, on the face of it, the
remarkable achievements of generations of human rights advocates.
Following this, in Section 2, we take an audit of scholarship into human
rights. In Section 3we outline the four critiques introduced above inmore
depth. Section 4 is a brief conclusion.
1 Globalizing Human Rights
The emergence of human rights as a global discourse was the culmination
of a long historical process. There is no consensus on the social and
5 See, for example, Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo (eds.),
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015);
Cindy Holder and David Reidy (eds.) Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty (eds.),
The Meanings of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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political origins of human rights.6 Rights-like ideas and practices have
been dated to antiquity, Roman law, late medieval European politics,
Calvinism, the middle ages, and the evolution of humanist sensibilities in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.7 The most inﬂuential narrative
sees post-Enlightenment European revulsion with torture and slavery at
the heart of a linear account of liberal progress, this “revolution in moral
sentiment” then globalized in the name of civilization through the vector
of empire.8 Its culmination came in the period immediately following
World War II and the Holocaust, when human rights were embedded
through a series of bold institutional developments such as the
Nuremberg trials, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the revised
Geneva Conventions.
Searching recent reassessments of this account have stressed the dis-
juncture between the 1940s and the 1970s. Rather than seeing human
rights progress as a linear development, more attention is given to the
lesser role that responses to the Holocaust actually played in stimulating
human rights institutions in the immediate postwar period, and the ways
rights displaced alternative organizing principles for justice and freedom
(e.g., socialism, national self-determination). The role of non-Western
actors in stimulating rights developments in the 1960s, particularly at the
UN, also ﬁts within this critical revisionism.9
6 For recent historical scholarship see: Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Akira Iriye,
Petra Goedde, and William I Hitchcock (eds.) The Human Rights Revolution:
An International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Samuel Moyn.
The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University
Press, 2010); Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human
Rights (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2005).
7 Micheline R. Ishay,The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization
Era (Oakland: University of California Press, 2008); Christian Reus-Smit, Individual
Rights and the Making of the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013); Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York:
W. W. Norton & Co, 2007); Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International
Human Rights: Visions Seen, 2nd edn. (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 2003); Mary
Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001); Aryeh Neier, The International
Human Rights Movement: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012);
Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi. Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of
Universal Justice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Moyn, The Last
Utopia.
8 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, but also Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
9 The most inﬂuential account is Moyn, The Last Utopia. See also Steven L. B. Jensen,
TheMaking of International HumanRights; The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction
of Global Values (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
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What is less contested in most of these histories is the importance of the
1970s as the moment of take-off for the modern human rights revolution,
and of the 1990s as the decade in which human rights achieved truly global
stature.10 President Jimmy Carter made human rights a centerpiece of
US foreign policy in 1977, the same year Amnesty International won the
Nobel Peace Prize and a year before Helsinki Watch, the forerunner of
HumanRightsWatch, was formed. Building on international covenants on
civil and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights ratiﬁed in the
mid-1970s, conventions were established on discrimination against
women (1981), against torture (1987), and on children’s rights (1989).
The UN secretary-general Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace of 1992 even
announced a new era where human rights would increasingly impose
conditions on legitimate sovereignty.11
As the Cold War ended, the era of institutionalized human rights famil-
iar to us today gathered pace with 1993’s UN Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna, which established the UN Ofﬁce of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights. This was followed by ad hoc tribunals
for Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), the Rome Statute (1998) and
the International Criminal Court (2002), the Responsibility to Protect
(2001/2005), the new Human Rights Council (2006), and the Universal
Periodic Review (2008). These were all signiﬁcant developments in the
law and compliance regime of human rights. Many other agreements and
institutions were set up or revitalized, at the regional and national levels,
and soon almost all advocates who sought progress on norms and their
implementation – from migrants to indigenous people to the disabled to
those ﬁghting against female genital mutilation – expressed their demands
in the language of human rights. Even humanitarian organizations such as
the ICRC and Oxfam followed suit.
Human rights are also now central to international condemnations of
atrocity crimes by states. The UN’s detailed report on the appalling con-
ditions in which people live in North Korea, released in February 2014,
uses human rights and theirmost far-reaching legalized expression – crimes
against humanity – as the framework for demanding both referral to the
ICC (now backed by the UN General Assembly) and even the use of
coercive pressure under the label of R2P.12 High-proﬁle human rights
10 Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
11 UN Security Council, An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the
Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 Jan 1992. June 17,
1992.
12 Report of the detailed ﬁndings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 2014, available at:
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campaigns – over Israeli shelling of Gaza, ISIS in Iraq, or civil war in
Syria – now get publicity on a global scale. Within the UN system, there
has been a major institutional shift with the implementation of a ‘Rights
Up Front’ policy following what was seen as the UN’s failure to protect
human rights during the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009. It is
intended to embed human rights in every aspect of the UN’s operational
work.13
As for the future, various initiatives are currently being proposed whose
aim is to fully globalize the reach of human rights law. For example,
a convention on crimes against humanity is being discussed within the
International Law Commission (as the Rome Statute was initially).14
This convention will, advocates hope, be a powerful tool for condemning
the worst state excesses, applying in peacetime as well as in war and ﬁlling
in several gaps that the current network of treaties leaves open. Advocates
for the convention even hope it might give impetus to prosecuting the
crime of aggression, the fourth major international crime under the Rome
Statute. As crimes against humanity are considered to be customary
international law, this would open up almost all state behavior to binding
legal accountability.
Second, the most ambitious proposal of all is perhaps a Swiss-led initia-
tive for a World Human Rights Court. This court, while treaty-based,
would apply to non-state actors as well as states, and would allow com-
plaints to be heard against non-parties to the statute provided they were
supported by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (in which
case, they would constitute opinions, not legally binding judgments).
The court would also be able to rule on the permissibility of reservations
entered by states to human rights treaties.15 The ICC’s focus on individual
criminal responsibility would be augmented by theWCHR’s focus on state
and non-state actor responsibility. The court might even, its advocates




14 See the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative, Fulﬁlling the Dictates of Public Conscience:
Moving Forward with a Convention on Crimes Against Humanity, Washington St Louis
School of Law (2014): http://law.wustl.edu/harris/documents/Final-CAHGenevaReport
-071714.pdf, and Leila Nadya Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes Against
Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
15 Martin Scheinin, “Towards a World Court for Human Rights,” advanced copy,
European University Institute, June 2009, p. 8 (available at: www.eui.eu/Documents/
DepartmentsCentres/AcademyofEuropeanLaw/CourseMaterialsHR/HR2009/Scheini
n/ScheininClassReading1.pdf).
16 Ibid., 26. In a withering critique, Philip Alston ﬁnds the idea of the court thoroughly
misconceived, a distraction from the difﬁcult business of improving human rights by
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This overview of signiﬁcant institutional achievements gives us a sense
of the aspirational character of the global human rights regime.17 All of
these developments in theory move us closer to the advocacy ideal of
a global constitution, a set of binding laws about appropriate behavior by
states, non-state actors, and individuals alike. In fact, though, each of
these institutions has embedded protections for states, and exceptions or
even exemptions for especially powerful ones. The ultimate prize – a law
without boundaries, with universal jurisdiction, beyond explicit state
consent that would move us “from consent to constitution,” from “a
state-centred world order to a new global order with [a] focus on the
individual endowed with rights” – has been heavily compromised.18
Institutional design rarely reﬂects the aspiration of advocates who seek
a world where due process and the rule of law hold superior authority to
state practice.
2 An Audit of Human Rights Scholarship
Empirical research on human rights has ﬂourished over the past two
decades, moving from a productive early phase of empirical theory
development into a more recent phase of sophisticated, multi-method
research and debate among different theoretical approaches and inference
strategies. This research has been explanatory as well as descriptive, quan-
titative as well as qualitative, experimental as well as observational, and
aimed at the development aswell as the testing of theory.19Over time, claims
for a difference in results based on method have been inconclusive.20
Rather, different methods have complementary strengths that can
compensate for corresponding weaknesses, with quantitative methods best
at assessing general patterns and qualitative methods stronger at verifying
non-judicial as well as judicial means, which requires giving more attention to certain
political realities; see “Against a World Court for Human Rights,” Ethics and
International Affairs, no. 2 (2014): 197–212.
17 See Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2011).
18 Scheinin, Towards a World Court, 9. Also Stephen Gardbaum, “Human Rights and
International Constitutionalism,” in Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International
Law, and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 233–57.
19 Emilie Hafner-Burton and James Ron, “Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through
Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes,” World Politics 61, no. 2 (April 2009): 360–401. For
a randomized experiment on women’s empowerment in Afghan villages, see
Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, “Empowering Women through
Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan,”American Political
Science Review 107, no. 3 (August 2013): 540–57.
20 Although compare, for e.g., Simmons’ and Clark’s largely conﬁrmatory studies with
Moyn’s and Hopgood’s largely skeptical historical and ethnographic studies.
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causal mechanisms. As a result, researchers have converged on a substantial
core of consensual ﬁndings on the conditions that facilitate good human
rights outcomes.
Consensus About Facilitating Conditions for Rights
Broad consensus exists across all kinds of empirical researchers, including
quantitative and qualitative, as well as critics and defenders of main-
stream practices, about the conditions that promote and hinder positive
rights outcomes. Quantitative studies report that two factors are the most
important predictors of the quality of rights outcomes in a country:
whether the country is at peace or at war, and how democratic the country
is. Some might see the democracy ﬁnding as bordering on the circular,
since most measures of democracy assume the existence of the civil
liberties and legal apparatus that makes democracy possible. And so it
is. But many of the other strong ﬁndings about the correlates of good
rights outcomes are either causes, attributes, or consequences of democ-
racy, which suggests that the link between democracy and rights is not just
a tautology, but is based on a complex of mutually supporting causal
factors that sustain rights outcomes. These include a reasonably high per
capita income, which is the single strongest predictor of democracy;
a fairly strong institutional capacity of the state, including an effective,
impartial bureaucracy as well as strong representative and legal institu-
tions, sometimes measured by the rough proxy of being a former British
colony; and a progressive, socially inclusive ruling coalition that is “on the
left.”21
Findings about the risk factors for rights also echo ﬁndings for democ-
racy. Economic inequality undermines both rights and democracy.22
A large population is likewise a risk factor for rights abuse, possibly
because of the difﬁculty of democratically governing culturally diverse
peoples in a single state.23 Some ﬁndings also suggest that there is “more
murder in the middle”: democratizing states endure similar levels of
rights abuse to authoritarian states as a result of contentious mass mobi-
lization in a context of weakly developed institutions for regulating mass
political participation. These studies ﬁnd that any beneﬁt from
21 Steven C. Poe, Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith, “Repression of the Human Right to
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years
1976–1993.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (1999): 291–313.
22 Todd Landman and Marco Larizza, “Inequality and Human Rights: Who Controls
What, When, and How,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2009), 715–36.
23 In some studies, though, this apparent ﬁnding may stem from a failure to weight results
by population.
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democratization accrues only after passing a rather high threshold to
nearly complete democracy.24 Another well-established literature, in
contrast, ﬁnds that treaty-signing and mainstream methods of legal and
activist follow-up have their greatest beneﬁt for rights improvement in
democratizing states.25
These seemingly contradictory ﬁndings could be simultaneously true if
violations rise mainly at the early phases of transition, when democracy is
very poorly institutionalized, and they decline in the more advanced
phases of transition. Alternatively, it could be that democratizers “in the
middle” are deadly unless they enjoy favorable facilitating conditions,
which mainstream rights methods try to encourage by treaty signing,
NGO activism, and lobbying for judicial independence.
These statistical results track fairly closely with the list of limiting
conditions set out by qualitative scholars for evaluating the spiral model
of rights promotion, which is based on the establishment of legal and
moral standards and the shaming and coercion of violators. The Persistent
Power of Human Rights argues that such methods are less effective in
authoritarian regimes, in very weak and very strong states, in issue areas
where violations are socially decentralized, and where the rights-abusing
state enjoys popular support.26 Persistent Power’s summary list of facilitat-
ing scope conditions omits peace and per capita income, though these are
implied in some of the empirical chapters. One, for example, notes that
protecting rights becomes an “almost insurmountable” task in wartime,
though some rebels may be restrained by a concern not to gain
a reputation for being lawbreakers.27
24 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Feyral Marie Cherif, George Downs, and Alastair Smith,
“Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights,”
International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005), 439–58; Helen Fein, “More Murder in
theMiddle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in theWorld, 1987,”Human Rights
Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1995), 170–91. Simmons,Mobilizing for Human Rights, refers to this
literature on p. 136, note 84. See also Christian Davenport and David Armstrong,
“Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to
1996,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 3 (2004), 538–54. See also
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968), for relevant theory.
25 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 153; Davenport and Armstrong, “Democracy
and the Violation of Human Rights,” 547; Fein, “More Murder in the Middle,” 177,
179, 181, 183. Simmons’ graph of the theoretically expected value of politicalmobilization
begins to arc upward as soon as autocracy ends, whereas Davenport’s and Fein’s charts of
actual outcomes show rights abuse remaining high and even trending slightly up at that
point and declining only in complete democracy.
26 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds.), Persistent Power; see also Kenneth Roth, “Africa:
The Attacks on the International Criminal Court,” New York Review of Books,
February 6, 2014, 32–5.
27 Hyeran Jo and Katherine Bryant, “Taming of the Warlords,” in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink
(eds.), Persistent Power, 239.
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Overall Trends in Human Rights Outcomes
Notwithstanding the consensus on facilitating conditions for rights in
general, there is much less consensus in the research on outcomes and
on the effects of tactical interventions designed to improve rights in
a speciﬁc setting. Here, the research ﬁndings are often contradictory,
limited by problems of data and research design, hedged by conditional
hypotheses that are not yet corroborated by replicating or extending
studies, or simply absent.
However, even when the full battery of methods is used in mutually
supportive ways, the ﬁeld still faces methodological challenges. Some origi-
nate in data problems. For example, comparing trends in human rights
compliance over time is difﬁcult because awareness of abuses and data
collection has changed. Likewise, scales for measuring abuses that were
designed to highlight the existence of even small numbers of rights violations
may be insensitive to larger differences in the number of violations at the
higher end of the scale.28More intractable are inference problems that hinge
on unobservable or unmeasureable factors. For example, James Meernik
et al. note that the power of rights-abusing spoilers is central to theories
about the effects of trials on human rights, but, like the rest of the quanti-
tative literature, their study lacks any way tomeasure this variable or include
its conditional effects in the analysis.29 Even qualitative studies have only
had limited success so far in conceptualizing the power of spoilers in a way
that permits reliable comparison across cases and causal process tracing.30
Critics of prevailing human rights strategies also argue that statistical
measures of most rights outcomes, deﬁned in terms of treaty compliance,
have not improved in recent decades, despite the intense rhetoric and
mobilization of the global rights movement.31 Defenders of the achieve-
ments of the human rights movement argue that the apparent lack of
progress is an optical illusion: improved data has turned up violations that
previously would have gone unreported.32 They also argue that real
28 Clark and Sikkink, “Information Effects and Human Rights Data.”
29 JamesMeernik, Kimi King, and Angela Nichols, “The Impact of International Tribunals
and Domestic Trials on Peace and Human Rights after Civil War,” International Studies
Perspectives 11, no. 4 (2010): 309–34.
30 Kelly Greenhill and SolomonMajor, “The Perils of Proﬁling: Civil War Spoilers and the
Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” International Security 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/
07): 7–40.
31 Emile M. Hafner-Burton, Making Human Rights a Reality (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013), 3. Improved data cuts bothways, civil war researchers frequently
adjusting their numbers downward as time passes and information improves.
32 Fariss, “Respect for HumanRights Has ImprovedOver Time,” proposes a very complex,
indirect method for calibrating biases in measuring rights violations due to increased data
availability, and historically changing standards, by making use of comparisons to con-
tinually updated historical data on the worst atrocities. He claims this technique shows
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improvements have occurred in some countries, especially democratizing
countries that have signed human rights treaties, but not in countries that
lie outside the scope conditions of current approaches.33 Finally, they
argue that it is too soon to judge the success of mainstream rights strate-
gies, because strengthening global norms through persuasion and insti-
tutionalization is necessarily a gradual process. For example, despite the
ICC’s minimal conviction rate and Africa-dominated docket, they
emphasize that the institutional base for future success has been
established.34 Thus, the lack of consensus is based on disputes about
the validity of data and on theoretically informed differences about how to
interpret evidence.
Tactical Interventions to Improve Rights
There is only partial consensus about the effects of different tactics, with
limited convergence reﬂecting underlying agreement about scope condi-
tions. Research suggests that mainstream rights approaches work well
mainly in what might be called easy cases: countries that are already fairly
democratic, have respectable administrative capacity, have somewhat
independent courts, and tolerate robust activism by principled civil
society groups.35 There is little agreement, however, on the effects of
different tactics in harder cases.
Results of statistical studies of shaming tactics, for example, are incon-
sistent and difﬁcult to interpret. Many studies have attempted to identify
the conditions in which shaming works, but with little convergence so far.
Some studies ﬁnd that shaming is often ineffective or even counterpro-
ductive, leading, for example, to backlash (see chapters by Vinjamuri, and
Cooley and Schaaf, this volume). Hafner-Burton, based on statistical
ﬁndings and numerous brief illustrations, ﬁnds that shaming is generally
correlated with improvements in political rights but not physical integrity
rights. She concludes that denunciations can have a “whack-a-mole”
effect, leading the abuser to shift from more visible repression to other
forms.36 Jennifer Lind’s detailed monograph, Sorry States, ﬁnds that
that rights outcomes are improving. Though an intriguing step forward, this methodol-
ogy requires making several heroic assumptions, including conﬁdence in updated atro-
cities data, which remains highly politicized. See Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill
(eds.) Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conﬂict
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), chapters 1, 6, 7, 8, and 11.
33 Clark and Sikkink, “Informational Effects”; Simmons,Mobilizing for Human Rights.
34 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “Conclusions,” Persistent Power, 281–2, 294.
35 Simmons,Mobilizing for Human Rights.
36 Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem.” International Organization 62, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 689–716;
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repeated international demands that Japan apologize for its WorldWar II
atrocities have played into the hands of Japanese nationalists who were
lobbying for ofﬁcial visits to the Shinto shrine where war criminals are
interred.37 Other studies stress more positive ﬁndings, many of them
trying to identify the conditions under which shaming is effective. Ann
Marie Clark, illustrating her statistical study with the example of
Indonesia, ﬁnds that shaming reduces rights abuse in countries that
have ratiﬁed rights treaties, even if they are non-democracies.38
An entirely statistical study by Matthew Krain found that shaming
reduced the severity of 29 genocides and mass killings from 1976 to
2008.39 Another entirely statistical study by Amanda Murdie and David
Davis, offered as a test of the spiral model, ﬁnds that shaming by human
rights organizations improves human rights if local human rights activists
are numerous and if third parties such as states echo the denunciations of
the activists.40
Why do these studies ﬁnd such varied results? One reason may be that
they ask somewhat different questions, advancing hypotheses that are
qualiﬁed in different ways, using different databases and research designs,
and covering different time periods.41 The inﬂuential study by Murdie
and Davis also raises the issue of how to interpret causality in
a multifaceted interaction among (1) shaming by rights organizations in
a setting in which (2) the ﬂourishing of local rights organizations is not
Darius Rejali makes a similar argument, claiming that pressure from human rights
advocates has driven states to adopt torture techniques that are less visible; see
Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
A factor that is not sufﬁciently taken into account by some of these studies is that
disproportionate publicity may be aimed at recalcitrant actors that are hardest to change.
If this were so, results would be biased against shaming tactics.
37 Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2008). See also Jelena Subotic,Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
38 Ann Marie Clark, “The Normative Context of Human Rights Criticism: Treaty
Ratiﬁcation andUNMechanisms,” in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, Persistent Power, chapter
7, p. 143.
39 Matthew Krain, “J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity
of Genocides or Politicides?” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2012): 574–89.
40 Amanda M. Murdie and David R. Davis, “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to
Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1
(2012): 1–16.
41 For example, the outcome variable in the Murdie and Davis study is improvement in
physical integrity rights, coded yes or no. Since they ﬁnd no effect when they use what
they call the “raw scores” for physical integrity rights, it may be that their reworked
measure is picking up very small improvements, which they magnify by their practice of
binary coding. The lack of even the briefest case illustrations further hinders the effort to
understand why studies report diverse ﬁndings. See also Oskar N. T. Thoms, James Ron,
and Roland Paris, “State-level Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?”
International Journal of Transitional Justice 4, no. 3 (2010): 329–54.
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suppressed by the state and (3) powerful outside parties, including states,
are also exerting pressure. Because all of these elements are included in
the spiral model, it is hard to tell whether shaming per se is doing much
causal work. A number of these studies imply that the scope conditions
for effective shaming may be quite narrow, putting its usefulness as
a widespread advocacy tactic in doubt.
Implications of Social Science Findings for Advocacy
From this preliminary audit, on which the chapters below reﬂect both
explicitly and implicitly, we draw an important conclusion. Despite the
sophistication of much contemporary scholarship, the only broad con-
sensus is on the background conditions that facilitate human rights suc-
cess (essentially, peace and democracy). Disagreement continues among
scholars over what the available data says about human rights outcomes in
general, and speciﬁc interventions in particular. Building on the ground-
breaking earlier work of Sikkink and Simmons, the chapter in Human
Rights Futures by Dancy and Sikkink makes a strong case for the effec-
tiveness of human rights mobilization. Much of the most inﬂuential
human rights scholarship draws on their arguments and data to substanti-
ate the claim that human rights are improving, indicating that the efforts
of transnational human rights movements using international and
national law can succeed.
For many advocates, this conclusion is both welcome and useful. They
often hold to a vision of human rights that is both normative and universal.
Human rights norms emerge and prevail at least in part, advocates claim,
because they are inherently persuasive to people’s innate sense of justice
and fairness, given exposure to information and arguments on their
behalf. In addition, human rights are accepted when they result from an
appropriate, largely voluntary, and substantially consensual process of
normative deliberation, such as processes of negotiating and ratifying
multilateral treaties. As a result, scholarly theories based on these
assumptions study the effects of ratifying treaties, persuading audiences
to adopt norms, institutionalizing them, and shaming and punishing
violators.42 These theories are sometimes based on an analogy to the
workings of domestic law and moral social rules.43
42 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics;
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887–918; Thomas Risse,
Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.) The Power of Human Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
43 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 170.
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Thus, the assumptions behind this kind of social science theory of
human rights processes and outcomes overlap to a considerable extent
with the explicit or implicit assumptions of many human rights organiza-
tions themselves.44 Indeed, inﬂuential scholarship drew lessons from the
practices of principled transnational activist networks in the ﬁrst place to
develop causal theories of rights promotion, such as the foundational
boomerang, norms cascade, and spiral models, as well as recent work on
international law as a lever for empowering rights activism in transitional
countries.45 Nevertheless, these scholarly, practice-derived accounts of
successful mobilization, embedding, and impact increasingly face a range
of reservations, questions, and critiques, as we now outline in Section 3.
3 Human Rights Mobilization and Its Critics
In this volume, we have grouped the chapters under four broad headings.
That the arguments made, and evidence presented, often spills over these
artiﬁcial boundaries we readily accept. But at the heart of each of the four
critiques is a distinct claim: that there are structural impediments to
human rights progress (scope conditions), that the scale and intensity of
the pushback against human rights is substantial (backlash), that global
rights rhetoric too often works at cross-purposes with local social justice
priorities (localization), and that the human rights project as a whole is
living on borrowed time (utopias and endtimes).
Scope Conditions
Mainstream approaches traditionally assume considerable leeway for
activism to make a difference even in the face of structural impediments.
The Power of Human Rights (1999) suggested that the spiral model could
work in a broad range of settings, including very poor countries with few
facilitating conditions for rights or democracy. The follow-up book orga-
nized by the same team, The Persistent Power of Human Rights (2013), has
muchmore to say about the limitations that structural parameters such as
the strength of the state place on the action of individuals in promoting or
abusing rights, but its message remains that meaningful progress is
possible.
Another approach assumes, however, that rights emerge, if at all, from
speciﬁc conﬁgurations of social power. It asks: who has control over
44 Of course, there are many more skeptical practitioners as well who would embrace some
aspects of the critiques outlined in Human Rights Futures.
45 See the references by Sikkink and by Simmons.
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resources and rule-setting, what rules are in their interest, and how do
they struggle and bargain over the creation of rules and institutions to
realize those interests?46 If this background social power is too weak to
sustain a popular reform coalition then the drive for human rights is like
a general without an army.
For example, a standard textbook on the history of rights traces their
incremental expansion as a result of social modernization from privileges
of armed nobility in such decrees as the Magna Carta, through civil and
political rights for urban commercial classes, and ﬁnally to social and
economic protections for the politically empowered working class.47
The research agenda that emerges from these assumptions tends to ask
questions about the power, interests, and coalition potential of rights-
promoting groups and of rights-abusing “spoilers.” Tactically, the
research focus is on conditional incentives, political bargaining, and
investment in enforcement institutions as precursors to the emergence of
rights.48 In this view, politics tends to lead; norms tend to follow. Under
scope conditions, we ask some searching questions of the norms-led narra-
tive of progress by looking at three sets of structural barriers in more
detail.
Snyder, for example, argues that successfulmovements for change have
been backed by well-placed, diversely motivated coalitions of political
actors whose existing power and inﬂuence can be used to align around
rights claims. But these are not necessarily rights-driven actors.49 Risse,
meanwhile, examines the prospect of human rights observance in areas of
limited statehood where the state is unable or unwilling to make its power
count.
These accounts remain committed to the successful realization of
human rights, but they take a pragmatic view of how that might be
achieved. In contrast to the use of shaming, moral condemnation and
persuasion, and the pursuit of ‘human rights ﬁrst’ (that is, human rights as
a process as well as an outcome), pragmatically minded scholars have
argued for compromises that include bargaining with powerful spoilers
46 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, volume II, The Rise of Classes and Nation-
States, 1760–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 6, discusses the
relationship between structural and normative power in the French Revolution.
47 Ishay, The History of Human Rights.
48 Hafner-Burton, Making Human Rights a Reality and Emilie Hafner-Burton, Forced to
Be Good: Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2009); Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism
in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/
04): 5–44.
49 Hafner-Burton focuses on the necessity of allying rights claims to political power as well,
making it clear that without the backing of major states the prospects for improvements in
human rights globally are diminished: Hafner-Burton,Making Human Rights a Reality.
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and striking amnesty deals that might reduce rights abuse by helping to
consolidate peace.50 They argue for the merits of sequencing the pursuit
of speciﬁc rights or accountability measures, working ﬁrst to create poli-
tical or institutional conditions that make rights feasible.51 On the geo-
political level, pragmatists stress the value of enlisting support for global
advocacy campaigns from rising democratic powers such as India, South
Africa, and Brazil, even if this means tailoring themes to their interests
and sensibilities. They also accept that human rights progress requires
making peace with the use of political and economic power to raise the
costs of non-compliance.52
Having said this, the normative and the social power approaches are
not mutually exclusive, and they do have some overlap. Both envision
a role for material coercion, and both are concerned with institutional
development. Nonetheless, they tend to prioritize different causal
mechanisms in terms of importance and in temporal sequence, and thus
make distinguishable empirical predictions that can be tested. Both also
realize that there is a particular problem with “hard cases.”
If debates about rights tactics sometimes sound like a dialogue of the
deaf, one reasonmay be a failure to be clear about the distinction between
easy and hard cases. Much empirical research portrays a division into
three distinct worlds of rights compliance: stable democracies, where
rights guarantees are routine notwithstanding peculiar “exceptionalisms”
and lapses; transitional states with some democratic features and some
liberal institutions, where violations may be common but mainstream
legal and activist methods can be effective (the “easy cases” for rights
promotion); and authoritarian states, where mainstream methods rarely
work and alternative methods are not well conceptualized or studied (the
“hard cases”).
Better locating the dividing line between “easy cases,” where main-
stream rightsmethods are promising, and “hard cases,”which are beyond
50 Carolyn M. Moehling, “State Child Labor Laws and the Decline of Child Labor,”
Explorations in Economic History 36, no. 1 (January 1999): 72–106. For an argument
that getting the right result by the wrong means is a violation of rights, not a success for
rights, see Kathryn Sikkink, “The Role of Consequences, Comparison and
Counterfactuals in Constructivist Ethical Thought,” in Richard Price, ed., Moral Limit
and Possibility in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2008),
83–111; Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Principled Pragmatism and the Logic of
Consequences,” International Theory. 4, no. 3 (November 2012): 434–48.
51 Remarks by Kenneth Roth, “Roth: In Syria Peace Talks, Keep Justice – Not Impunity –
on the Table,” International Peace Institute, January 17, 2014, www.ipinst.org/events/pa
nel-discussions/details/509-roth-in-syria-peace-talks-keep-justicenot-impunityon-the-ta
ble.html; Also, remarks by Aryeh Neier on the Arab Revolutions, European Council on
Foreign Relations, London, March 9, 2011.
52 Hafner-Burton,Making Human Rights a Reality.
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the scope conditions of mainstream theories and methods, would be of
great value for scholarship and human rights practice.
Backlash
Early theories of human rights promotion placed most of their emphasis
on the persuasive or coercive initiatives of rights promoters. The targets of
inﬂuence were typically portrayed as out-argued, out-gunned, or lured
down the slippery slope of compliance. Updated versions of the spiral
model, however, join the scope conditions, backlash, and localization
approaches in acknowledging that rights promotion is often relentlessly
contested by actors drawing on a deep well of social, cultural, ideological,
material, and geographic resources.
In many of these cases, entrenched and powerful spoilers have pushed
back against the encroachment of human rights on their autonomy,
sometimes strengthening their domestic base of support by mobilizing
alternative value systems, at other times creating alternative venues that
bypass rights or reinterpreting the demands of those rights so they no
longer conﬂict with sovereign prerogatives. As human rights advocacy has
grown stronger and more intrusive, many state leaders have become
increasingly strategic in their response – for example, turning to regional
institutions to deﬂect and restrict international human rights or even to
create counternorms (Vinjamuri, and Cooley and Schaaf, this volume).
Backlash is “a behavioral response to the application or clear anticipa-
tion of a speciﬁc policy or institutional practice that is perceived to be in
opposition to the interests or values of a particular actor or set of actors.
It is characterized by an attempt to alter, restrict, subvert, or otherwise
resist this application of policy or practice” (Vinjamuri, this volume).
Backlash does not need to be a direct response to the promotion of
human rights norms, in other words, but may be pre-emptive. It may
also range from great powers explicitly rejecting the reach of human rights
(e.g., Russia, China, and the United States refusing to join the ICC), to
medium-sized and smaller powers frustrating the due process of interna-
tional human rights and international justice processes (e.g., Turkey and
Egypt, or Kenya and South Africa over the ICC). Restricting the activities
of human rights NGOs (by barring foreign funding, for instance, or
changing tax and registration rules) or challenging human rights norms
through a countervailing sovereignty and stability discourse are further
examples.
In her chapter for this collection, Hurd points to a further irony: the
very activities of human rights promoters may bring about a deterioration
in the long-term prospects for human rights observance. By advocating
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the right to religious freedom, and thus accentuating the advantages –
recognition, mobilization, inﬂuence – that come with identifying as
a religious group, the possibility for conﬂict over fundamental norms
may be enhanced. As an unintended consequence, human rights promo-
tion helps create the very circumstances that it is most keen to avoid.
Advocates for the success of human rights might ask why be so con-
cerned with backlash now – after all, there has always been resistance to
human rights from both the left and the right, as well as from religious
groups? One explanation is that the very ubiquity of rights, and their use
as conditional aspects of global governance and foreign policy prescrip-
tions (e.g., the United States and Venezuela), gives them a power and
inﬂuence they have only had since the 1990s. They now threaten estab-
lished authorities in a way they never have before.Moreover, in a world in
which China is rising, the international system now has at least one great
power (two, if we count Russia) that openly rejects the rights discourse,
providing inspiration and diplomatic cover for other resistors.
Localization
A third approach assumes that, while rights concepts may have analogues
inmost of the world’s cultures, they emerge in local forms using vernacular
terminologies in different cultural settings. The research agenda that
emerges from this perspective (associated most prominently with Sally
Engle Merry, this volume, and Amitav Acharya) asks questions about
how local discourses interact with the universalistic language of the con-
temporary global human rights movement.
These “vernacularizers” or “localizers” of rights have stressed the role
of local brokers capable of adapting norms to local cultures.53 This is not
necessarily a unidirectional process. The current research agenda, while
retaining the basic propositions of largely one-way inﬂuence models, now
routinely accepts that all interactions on rights are two-way (or more
likely multi-directional), involving “blocking,” “backdooring,” “multi-
vocality,” and phony compliance with norms of legal accountability
(Hertel, this volume).54
53 Peggy Levitt and Sally Engle Merry, “Making Women’s Human Rights in the
Vernacular: Navigating the Culture/Rights Divide,” in Gender and Culture at the Limit of
Rights, Dorothy Hodgson (ed.) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
pp. 81–100); Aaron Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Lost in Translation? Civil
Society and the Negotiation of International Norms,” International Journal of
Transitional Justice (Special Issue on Civil Society) 5, no. 3 (2011): 345–65.
54 In addition to Persistent Power of Human Rights and Shareen Hertel, Unexpected Power:
Conﬂict and Change among Transnational Activists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2006), see Kate Cronin-Furman, “Managing Expectations: International Criminal
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Successful rights promotion outside the West, say advocates of verna-
cularization, requires more scope for domestic agents to draw on local
culture to create normative alternatives that secure autonomy for locals.
They need to do this, however, without potential converts to rights
becoming alienated from the rights-compatible discourses and practices
to which they are already committed. Vernacularization, they note, has
been most successful when local brokers are anchored domestically and
have good networks abroad that enable them to adapt international
norms to local contexts. Grounding international norms in local culture
reduces the risk that spoilers will be able to brand rights activists as
handmaidens of imperialism. It is even possible to see “American excep-
tionalism” on this basis as a kind of vernacularization.
In some cases, cultural differences have driven a wedge through trans-
national human rights networks, separating international advocates from
local activists. Human rights norms have failed to gain traction where they
seem tangential to solving the most pressing problems, like endemic
poverty, underdevelopment, climate change, or disease. In countries
where elites can appeal to Islam, evangelical Christianity, and even the
Catholic Church, pressures to embrace women’s rights have been easily
deﬂected. As a consequence, translating rights ideas into the vernacular
may also at times grease a slippery slope toward transgression.
Scholarly research has addressed the effectiveness of different persua-
sion techniques to enrich and diversify global rights cultures across
cultural boundaries, including analyzing both the modalities of decentra-
lization and two-way dialogue.55Merry makes the point that the power of
the human rights message for downtrodden constituencies in developing
countries stems in large part from the idea that universal ideals pro-
pounded by the most powerful, successful societies in the world are
being applied to their own situation, no matter what local norms say.
Thus, she raises the question of the trade-off in effectiveness between the
Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity,” International Journal of
Transitional Justice 7, no. 3 (2013): 434–54, ﬁrst published online August 7, 2013
doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijt016; Subotic, Hijacked Justice; Boesenecker and Vinjamuri, “Lost in
Translation?”; Amitav Acharya, “Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty,
Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the Third World,’” International Studies Quarterly 55,
No. 1 (March 2011): 95–123, and Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 67–77.
55 Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, “Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global
Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India, and the United States,”Global Networks 9, No. 4
(2009); Amitav Acharya, Rethinking Power, Institutions, and Ideas in World Politics: Whose
IR? (London: Routledge, 2013); Lila Abu Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need
Saving? Anthropological Reﬂections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American
Anthropologist 104, No. 3 (September 2002): 783–90; AndrewMoravcsik, “The Paradox
of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” in Michael Ignatieff (ed.) American Exceptionalism and
Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 147–97.
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charisma of universality and the ease of adaptation into local language
and practice. Like the question of the potential distortion – indeed,
perversion – of rights concepts through vernacularization, this subject
has been noticed but barely studied, let alone studied in a systematic way
that asks when one horn of the dilemma predominates.
Empirical studies of vernacularization so far mainly serve the develop-
ment and illustration of theory rather than the testing of it. Such illus-
trative studies include accounts of improvements in grass-roots women’s
rights practices in India without using rights language, and of the transla-
tion of universalistic rights arguments opposing female genital cutting
into local Suﬁ religious doctrine in Senegal.56 More mixed results, how-
ever, are reported in theory-building case studies of resistance to main-
stream international rights frames by local activists in the global South
who pursue different rights goals or prefer different kinds of rights
justiﬁcations.57 Similarly, scholars diverge in their estimation of whether
local justice initiatives comply with or represent an unsettling departure
from international human rights standards.58 Finally, rights vernacular-
ization studies also include unsettling accounts of human rights talk being
used to justify the lynching of criminals by urban vigilantes as well as
torture of suspects by police with special human rights training.59 A next
step for studies of vernacularization may be to specify conditions under
which local translation facilitates or undermines adoption of rights
thinking.
Utopias and Endtimes
A ﬁnal approach to the future of human rights questions both the norma-
tive universalism of mainstream rights thinking and the global conver-
gence assumptions of liberal modernization theory. Taking the
vernacularization agenda a step further, this approach questions whether
the cross-cultural impact of the human rights project is too superﬁcial to
thrive in the event of American hegemonic decline and the emergence of
56 Levitt and Merry, “Vernacularization on the Ground”; Alfred Stepan, “Rituals of
Respect: Suﬁs and Secularists in Senegal in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative
Politics 44, no. 4 (July 2012): 379–401.
57 See Hertel, Unexpected Power, on blocking in Bangladesh and backdooring in Mexico.
58 See Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts and Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda:
Justice without Lawyers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and
Lars Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and
Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal,” Fordham International Law Journal 33, no. 4
(2010): 1221–77.
59 Daniel Goldstein, Outlawed: Between Security and Rights in a Bolivian City (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2012); Rachel Wahl, Just Violence: Torture and Human Rights in
the Eyes of the Police (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017).
Introduction: Human Rights Past, Present, and Future 21
multiple modernities, including illiberal ones (Hopgood, this volume).
It also suggests that Western liberalism has taken a wrong turn, over-
investing in the rights approach to liberal progress and systematically
sidelining both ideas (like freedom and equality) and alternative mobiliz-
ing principles (national self-determination, socialism) that promise more
genuine normative progress (Moyn, this volume).
This research agenda asks whether human rights thinking is an
unexportable product of liberal capitalism, whether it lacks the pene-
tration power of earlier forms of cultural imperialism such as
Christianity, whether the international human rights movement is
recent and superﬁcial, and whether it competes ideologically with
and crowds out more promising mass-based movements for social
justice?60 These accounts are more critical of the whole enterprise of
human rights. They suggest a future in which the aspiration to human
rights is largely restricted to a zone of liberal-democratic states in the
West. These accounts doubt the emancipatory potential of the transna-
tional middle class and fear that the challenge to global liberal norms by
Russia and China, as well as by populist nationalism in several Western
states, including the United States, heralds a permanent reverse for
human rights in an increasingly multipolar, even post-Western world.
Increased backlash is evidence of existential contestation, in other
words.
By monopolizing the liberal approach to freedom, rights have sidelined
a much richer tradition of human progress and undermined their own
emancipatory potential in the process. Furthermore, given the forces now
arrayed against human rights, the narrow cultural roots of their under-
lying conception of the person and the distributional consequences they
entail for equality in society are becoming clearer.
4 Conclusion
Contemporary rights practitioners have actively debated how to respond
to these challenges, just as scholars have worked hard to ﬁgure out how to
measure them. Many practitioners favor retaining a core focus on civil
and political rights, a central role for legal tools in rights promotion, and
adherence to universal standards. For many scholars and also advocates,
the rights project is a long-term game; pushback and hypocrisy are inevi-
table, but temporary, setbacks. Growing participation in rights promo-
tion by non-Western activists is an important objective, they agree, but
not at the expense of watering down core principles. Others argue that
60 Moyn, Last Utopia; Hopgood, Endtimes.
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pragmatism is a realistic necessity in a world that’s very different from that
of the 1970s or even the 1990s.
To paraphrase Santayana, to get where you want to go you need to
know where you have been, or at least your direction of travel. This is the
spirit in which this volume was assembled. The chapters are written by
scholars in political science, history, and anthropology whose work has
shaped the development of debates about human rights over the past two
decades. Our hope is to try to see the future through analyses of human
rights that are rooted ﬁrmly in their past and present circumstances.
We have seen that signiﬁcant differences exist within the worlds of
human rights advocacy and scholarship on a number of issues and these
can be simpliﬁed into three questions: Have human rights improved?
If so, why have they improved (and if not, why not)? And what are the
alternatives to business as usual? Should we do more of the same in
tackling hard cases, should we bemore savvy (or cut our losses), or should
we do something else entirely? There could hardly be more pressing
questions to ask in the changing world we live in.
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